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The use of forward interest rates as a monetary policy indicator is demonstrated, using
Sweden 1992-1994 as an example. The forward rates are interpreted as indicating market
expectations of the time-path of future interest rates, future inflation rates, andfuture currency
depreciation rates. They separate market expectations for the short, medium and long term more
easily than the standard yield curve. Forward rates are estimated with anextended and more
flexible version of Nelson and Siegel's functional form.
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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the use of forward interest rates as a monetary
policy indicator. Forward interest rates are interest rates on investment andloans that start at
a future date, the settlement date, and last to a date further intothe future, the maturity date.
Both the estimation and the interpretation of forward rates will be discussed. Sweden during
the eventful period 1092-1994 is chosen as an example.
The paper is motivated by the increased need for monetary policy indicators when flexible
exchange rates have replaced fixed exchange rates. The collapse of fixed exchange rates in Europe
and the widening of ERM bands mean that a well-defined intermediate target for monetary policy
has been lost. In this situation, whether a new intermediate target is introduced or not, the role
of indicators will be crucial, for assessing the state of the economy and the stance of monetary
policy, and for deciding whether the instrument of monetary policy is on a path appropriate
for achieving the goal of monetary policy. Forward interest rates should be suitable as one of
the several indicators that need to be used. They should of course never be used as the only
indicator.
The use of forward interest rates has long been standard in financial analysis, for instance
in pricing new financial instruments and in discovering arbitrage possibilities. Although the
use of yield curves is standard in monetary policy analysis in centralbanks and elsewhere, the
use of forward interest rates for monetary policy purposes appears tobe relatively recent. For
instance, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bank of England,and Sveriges
Riksbank have recently started to use forward interest rates among other indicators.'
In the absence of a full set of forward markets, implied forward interest rates need to be
estimated from data on existing financial instruments, usually Treasury bills and Government
bonds. For financial analysis, the estimation of forward rates is done with a number of different
methods, some rather complex in order to achieve sufficient precision. For monetary policy
analysis, the demand for precision is arguably less, which can be traded for increased robustness
and simplicity of the estimation method. Here I will use an estimation method that is simple
and robust but appears to have a precision well beyond what is needed for monetary policy
purposes.
Forward interest rates will, under specified assumptions, be interpreted as indicating market
expectations of future short interest rates, inflation rates and currency depreciation rates,and
used to interpret Swedish monetary policy during the period from May 1992, six monthsbefore
'See Bank of England (1993a,b) Reinha.rt end Klapper (1992), and Sveriges Riksbank(1993a,b).Cf. also
Bank of International Settlement (1993).
Ithe kroua was floated in November, until June 1994. Forward rates contain the sameinformation
as the standard yield curve. Indeed, the forward rate curveis related to the yield curve as the
marginal cost curve is to the average cost curve. Forward rates presentthe information in a
way more easily interpreted for monetary policy purposes.Whereas the yield curve can be
interpreted as expected future averagesofthe variables in focus, the forward rate curve can be
interpreted as indicating the expected future time path of these variables.Therefore forward
rates more easily allow a separation of expectations for the short, mediumand long term than
the yield curve. This is the main advantage of forward rates.2
Section 2 of the paper defines and discusses the relations between spot rates (zero-coupon
rates), yields to maturity and forward interest rate. Section 3 presents the estimation method.
Readers not interested in technical details can skim these two sections. Section 4 discusses
the interpretation of forward rates in general, and Section 5 discusses the interpretation of the
Swedish forward rates in particular. Section 6 presents the conclusions. The Appendix reports
some technical aspects of the estimation.
2. Spot rates, yields to maturity, and forward rates
In the absence of explicit forward markets, implied forward interest rates have to be estimated
from interest rates on existing financial instruments. To compute implied forward interest rates
from yields to maturity on zero-coupon bonds, spot rates, is easy. To compute implied forward
interest rates from yields to maturity on coupon bonds is more complicated. Inconveniently,
almost all bonds with time to maturity beyond 12 months are coupon bonds rather than zero-
coupon bonds. Yields to maturity on coupon bonds are not identical to yields to maturity on
zero-coupon bonds of the same maturity. Since a coupon bond can be seen as a portfolioof
zero-coupon bonds of different maturities (each zero-coupon bond corresponding to a. particular
coupon payment), yields to maturity on coupon bonds are a kind of average of yields to maturity
on zero-coupon bonds of maturities from the time of the first coupon payment to the time of
the payment of the face value and last coupon. Estimating forward rates from coupon bonds
can then be seen as involving two steps: first implied spot rates are estimated from yields to
maturity on coupon bonds, and then implied forward rates are computed from implied spot
rates.
To understand this more precisely, some algebra is needed. The algebra of spot rates, yields to
maturity on coupon bonds, and forward rates is easiest if all rates are continuously compounded.3
2The analogywith averageandmarginal coat is exact when interest ratesare continuously compounded, and
whenazero-couponyield curve is used. The analogyis approximate forcoupon bond yieldcurves,andfor
annually compounded interestrates.
3Thecontinuously compounded spot rate i andtheannuallycompoundedspot rate(bothmeasuredinpercent
per year) arerelatedby; =100(exp[thJ—1) andi = IOOln[1+ See Shiller (1990)or Frage (1986) for details
2Let i(t, T) (measured in percent per year) be the continuously compounded spot interest rate for
a zero coupon bond traded at time i, the trade date, that matures at time T> t, the maturity
date. Let rn =T—tdenote the time to maturity. The term structure of interest rates at
a given trade date t is unambiguously represented by a graph of the spot rate i(t,t + m) for
different times to maturity m. Let d(i,T), the discount function, denote the price at time t of
a zero-coupon bond that pays 1 krona at the maturity date T. It is related to the spot rate by
d(i,T) =exp(_')(T_ t)), (2.1)
where exp(x) denotes the exponential function
Consider now a coupon bond with coupon rate c percent per year, a bond that pays a face
value of 100 kronor at the maturity date but also pays an annual coupon of c kronor each year
up to and including the maturity date. Let the time to maturity be m years.4 The present value
at the trade date i of a coupon payment made in year k, k =1,2,...,m,will be cd(t, t + k) and
the present value of the face value paid in year m will be lOOd(t,i+m). It follows that the price
of the bond at the trade date, P(t, t + m), will equal
P(t,t + m) =cd(t,t+ k)+ lOOd(t,t+ m). (2.2)
For coupon bonds, yields to maturity are often quoted. The yield to maturity is the internal
rate of return for the coupon bond, that is, the constant interest rate that makes the present
value of the coupon payments and the face value equal to the price of the bond. Hence the yield
to maturity y(t, i + rn) (measured in percent per year) on the coupon bond fulfills the equation
P(t,t + m) =cexp(_Y(tt+ m)k) + lOOexp (_(it+ m)m) (2.3)
Yield curves showing the yield to maturity on coupon bonds for different maturities are
frequently used to represent the term structure of interest rates. Such yield curves are an
imprecise representation of the term structure of interest rates, though. First, a given yield to
maturity can be seen as an average of the spot rates up to the time to maturity. The present
values of the coupon payments and face value that are used to price the bond in equation (2.2)
correspond to spot rates in (2.1) that generally vary with the maturity. In contrast, the present
values of the coupon payments and face value that are used to price the bond in equation (2.3)
on the algebra of spot rates, yields to maturity and forward rates.
'The general case when the time to maturity is not an integer is handled in the Appendix. For semi-annual
couponpayments,as in Britain and the United States, the (ormulas are accordingly modified (see for instance
Fage (1986)).
3are computed with a constant yield to maturity, which is hence a somewhat complicated average
of the spot rates. Second, for a given term structure of spot rates, the yield to maturity for
a bond with a given maturity will depend on its coupon rate, the "coupon effect." Therefore
two coupon bonds that mature at the same date generally have different yields to maturity if
they have different coupon rates. The reason is that, everything else equal, a higher coupon rate
implies that the share of early payments increases, which gives more weight to short spot rates
in the determination of the yield to maturity.
For these reasons yield curves for coupon bonds should not be used as direct representations
of the term structure of interest rates. Instead spot rates should be used.5 For maturities below
12 months spot rates are directly available in the form of rates on Treasury bills, which are zero-
coupon bonds. For longer maturities zero-coupon bonds are usually not available for sufficiently
many maturities and in sufficiently large issues to be sufficiently liquid. Therefore, spot rates
will have to be estimated from yields on coupon bonds. Also, even if there were quite a few
Liquid longer-maturity zero-coupon bonds, one might still want to use the additional information
in the coupon bond yields.
Implied forward rates are easy to calculate from spot rates, since a forward investment with
specific settlement and maturity dates can be reproduced by a sale and a purchase of zero-coupon
bonds: a sale of a bond maturing on the forward contract's settlement date and a purchase of
bonds of the same market value that matures on the forward contract's maturity date. The
implied forward rate is the return on such a readjustment of a bond portfolio.
More precisely, let f(i, t', T) (measured in percent per year) be the continuously compounded
(implied) forward rate on a forward contract concluded at time i, the trade date, for an invest-
ment that starts at time t' > t, the settlement date, and ends at time T > t', the maturity date.
Then the forward rate is related to the spot rates according to
ft t' T —(T—t)i(t,T)—(t'—t)i(t,t') 24
T—t'
. ( . )
Thatis, the forward rate for a 1-year investment with settlement in 4 years (t' —t= 4 years)
and maturity in 5 years (T —t= 5 years) ("the 1-year forward rate 4 years from now") is equal
to 5 times the 5-year spot rate minus 4 times the 4-year spot rate.
The instantaneous(-maturity) forward rate is the forward rate for a forward contract with
an infinitesimal investment period after the settlement date, and it is defined as the limit
f(t, ') = ',f(t,t', T). (2.5)
so-calledparyield curveis an alternative way to unambiguously represent the term structure of interest
rates.
4In practice it can be identified with an overnight forward rate, that is, a forward rate with
maturity one day after settlement. The finite-maturity forward rate f(t,t',T), T > t', will be
the average of the instantaneous forward rates with settlement between t'andT,
f(t,i',T) =f!,f(t,r)dr (2.6)
The instantaneous forward rate can be seen as the marginal increase in the total return from
a marginal increase in the length of the investment. Instantaneous forward ratesand finite-
maturity spot rates are therefore related precisely as marginal and average cost of production,
when the time to maturity is identified with quantity produced. The spot rate i(t,T) at time
twithmaturity at time T is hence identical to the average of the instantaneous forward rates
with settlements between the trade date t and the maturity date T,
i(,T)ff(t,r)dr (2.7)
Equivalently, the forward and spot rates fulfill the relation
f(t,T)i(t,T) + (T —t)0,T), (2.8)
which is another standard relation between marginal and average cost, with time to maturity
T —icorresponding to quantity produced. Hence, when looking at spot and forward rates we
shall often recognize the shapes of average and marginal curves familiar from microceconomics
textbooks.
3. Estimating forward rates
The estimation of spot and forward rates follows McCulloch (1971, 1975) in fitting for each
trade date a discount function (the price of a zero-coupon bond as a function of the time to
maturity) to bill and bond price data, but it uses an extension of the functional form ofNelson
and Siegel (1987) instead of McCulloch's original cubic spline. The cubic spUme has the well-
known disadvantage that estimates of forward rates may be rather unstable, especially at the
longest maturity (Shea (1984)).6
Nelson and Siegel (1987) assume that the instantaneous forward rate is the solution to a
6Dahlquist and Svensson (1994) compares the original functional form of Nelson and Siegel (1987) to the much
more complex functional form of Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) on Swedish data forthe sample period December
1992-June 1993. The Nelson and Siegel functional form is much easier to use than the Longstal and Schwartz
functional form. The additional flexibility of the Longitaff and Schwartz functional form ii not needed for that
sample period. When additional flexibility ii needed for a few trade dates in the longer samplein the present
paper, the extended Nelson and Siegel functional form is chosen sinceit is much easier to use than the Longstaff
and Schwartz functional form.
5second-order differential equation with two equal roots. Let me simplify the notation by letting
f(in) denote the instantaneous forward rate f(t,t + in) with time to settlement in, for a given
trade date i. Then Nelson and Siegel's forward rate function can be written
m m in
f(m;b) =/3+ /3iexp (——)+/32exp (——), (3.1)
Ti Tj Ti
where b =(fib,i3, 132, r1) is a vector of parameters (i3o and r1 must be positive).
The forward rate in (3.1) consists of three components. The first is a constant, /3, the
second is an exponential term /3i exp (—)monotonicallydecreasing (or increasing, if /3 is
negative) towards zero as a function of the time to settlement, and the third is a term which
generates a hump-shape (or a U-shape, if /32 is negative) as a function of the time to settlement,
j3j' exp (—).Whenthe time to settlement approaches infinity, the forward rate approaches
the constant fin, and when the time to settlement approaches zero, the forward rate approaches
the constant + j3.
To increase the flexibility and improve the fit I extend Nelson and Siegel's function by
adding a fourth term, a second hump-shape (or U-shape), /3exp(—),withtwo additional
parameters, /33 and r2 (r2 must be positive). The function is then
f(m; b)/3o + fijexp(—)+exp (—)+ exp (—!?!), (3.2)
where b= ( 1o,i3, /32,r1,133,T2).
The function and its components is illustrated in Figure Jo. The parameters are 13o = 8.06
percentper year, fi= -0.31percent per year, /32 =-6.25percent per year, r1 =1.58year, j3
= -1.98 percent per year and r2 = 0.15 year. (These are the estimates for Sweden for the trade
date December 29, 1993.) The thick solid curve is the forward rate curve. The other curves
show the four components of the forward rate curve.
The spot rate can be derived by integrating the forward rate according to (2.7). Let i(m)





Fisher, Nychka and Zervos (1994) have recently provided several important extenion to McCulloch'a cubic
spline method.
6The discount function is then given by
d(rn;b) exp (2b)) (3.4)
The discount function is estimated for each trade date by minimizing either (the sum of
squared) price errors or (the sum of squared) yield errors. Let me first discuss minimizing price
errors. Then, for given parameters the discount function is used to compute estimated bond
prices according to (2.2). The parameters are then chosen so as to minimize the sum of squared
errors between the estimated and observed prices of the bonds, where the observed prices of
the bonds are calculated from quoted yields to maturity, coupon rates and times to maturity
according to (2.3). This is the standard way since McCulloch (1971, 1975).
Minimizing price errors sometimes results in fairly large yield errors for bonds and bills with
short maturities. This is because prices are very insensitive to yields for short maturities.7 Then
it may be better to chose the parameters so as to minimize yield errors. One can also argue that
since in monetary policy analysis the focus is on interest rates rather than prices, it makes sense
to minimize errors in the yield dimension rather than in the price dimension. When yield errors
are minimized, for given parameters the discount function is still used to compute estimated
prices of coupon bonds according to (2.2). Then the estimated yield to maturity for each bond
is computed by solving (2.3). The parameters are then chosen so as to minimize the sum of
squared yield errors between estimated yields and observed yields.
The estimation is done with Maximum Likelihood, although Nonlinear Least Squares or the
Generalized Method of Moments can also be used. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
for the parameters are estimated and used with the so called delta method to obtain confidence
intervals for spot and forward rates. Details of the estimation method are given in the Appendix.
In some cases minimizing price errors results in quite good fits of yields. In many cases,
however, the yield fit for short maturities appears less than satisfactory, and minimizing the
yield errors then gives a much better fit, usually with only a minor deterioration of the price fit.
In most cases the original Nelson and Siegel model gives a satisfactory fit. In some case
when the term structure is more complex the fit of the original Nelson and Siegel model is
unsatisfactory. Then the extended model improves the fit considerably.
As an example of an estimation result, see Figure lb. It shows the estimate for Sweden
for the trade date December 29, 1993. The estimation is done with minimized yield errors, for
the extended Nelson and Siegel model. The squares show the observed marginal lending rate
and observed yields to maturity on Treasury bills and Government benchmark bonds, plotted
TRecall that the elasticity of the price with respect to one plus the yield is equal to the duration of a bond
(the present-value weighted average maturity of coupon payments and face value).
7against the maturity date.8 All rates are annually compounded. The pluses show the coupon
rates for the bonds (the Treasury bills and the marginal lending rate have zero coupons). The
dashed curve shows the estimated spot rate curve, the zero-coupon rates. The error bars show
95 percent confidence intervals. Dots with error bars show the estimated yields to maturity
with 95 percent confidence intervals (the estimated. yields are on the spot rate curve for zero-
coupon bonds but are generally not so for coupon bonds, since yields to maturity on coupon
bonds generally differ from yields to maturity on zero-coupon bonds). The fit is good, and the
error bars are hardly visible. The solid curve shows the estimated (instantaneous) forward rate,
plotted against the settlement date, with error bars showing 95 percent confidence intervals.
The horizontal dashed line is the asymptote for the spot and forward rate (the parameter
The root mean squared yield error for this estimation is 0.03 percentage points per year, the
root mean squared price error is 0.16 kronor for a bond with face value 100 kronor.
In this case the spot rate curve has a U-shape similar to the standard shape of average cost
curves in microeconomics textbooks. Consequently, the forward rate curve has a shape similar
to the standard shape of marginal cost curves. We see that the spot and forward rate curves
start at the same point for zero time to maturity (the overnight rate), then while the spot rate
is decreasing in the time to maturity the forward rate is below the spot rate. The forward rate
curve cuts the spot rate curve in the latter's minimum, and when spot rates are increasing in
the time to maturity the forward rate is above the spot rate.
The forward rate has a more complex shape on December 29, 1993, than normally, with a
conspicuous kink for about 3 months settlement. Therefore, the fit with the original Nelson and
Siegel functional form is unsatisfactory, and the extended variant results in a much better fit.
For details about the fit with the original form and for minimized price errors, see the Appendix.
4. Interpreting forward rates
Under the assumption that the forward term premium is negligible, forward rates can be inter-
preted as expected future spot rates. The forward term premium is the expected excess return
on a forward investment, that is, the excess of the forward interest rate over the spot rate that
is expected on the forward contract's trade date to rule on the forward contract's settlement
date. The assumption of zero term premia, the so called expectations hypothesis for the term
structure of interest rates, have been frequently tested and often been rejected.9 On the other
The marginal lending rate was, through May 1994, the overnight rate at which banks could borrow reserves
from the Riksbank. It can be seen as the Riksbank'smonetarypolicy instrument. Arbitrage by banks implied
that the interbank overnight rate would be close to the marginal lending rate.
From June 1, 1994, the Riksbank uses a system similar to that of Bundesbank, in that the repo rate bounded
by a floor (the deposit rate) and a ceiling (the lending rate) serves as the policy instrument.
See Shifler (1990) and Campbell and Shiler (1991). Fama and Bliss (1987) cannot, however, reject the
expectations hypothesis for some combinations of settlement and maturity that ale highly relevant for monetary
8hand, attempts to estimate forward term premia have resulted in rather small estimates. The
issue is complicated by the fact that there are three related but distinct term premia which are
sometimes confused: the forward term premium, the holding period term premium, and the
rollover term premium.'° Furthermore, the combinations of settlement and maturity that are
examined in the literature are often not the combinations that are most relevant for monetary
policy. Upward-sloping yield curves, that is, long rates being higher than short rates, are some-
times taken as implying positive term premia. That implication is not correct if short interest
rates have been rising over the sample period, which is the case with many samples. See Svensson
(1993c) for further discussion of these points, for references to the literature, and for empirical
results on McCulloch's (1990) long sample of U.S. data that indicate that average term preniia
have been negligible even though the yield curve has on average been upward sloping.11
In the rest of the paper forward term premia will be disregarded, except when they are
explicitly discussed in section 5.7 below. The (instantaneous) forward rate curve can then be
interpreted as indicating the expected time path of future overnight rates. Since in Sweden the
overnight rate by arbitrage is close to the Riksbank's monetary instrument, the marginal lending
rate before June 1, 1994, and the repo rate after that date, the forward rate curve can also be
interpreted as indicating the expected time-path of the future marginal lending/repo rates and
hence, in that sense, the expected time path of future monetary policy.
Under the assumption that the inflation risk premium is zero, the Fisher equation holds.
That is, the expected inflation equals the difference between the nominal spot rate and the real
spot rate. Then, conditional upon an assumption of a given expected future short real interest
rate, the expected inflation rate at a give future date equals the difference between the expected
future short nominal and real rates at that future date. Since the forward rate indicates expected
future short rates, the gap between the forward rate curve and the assumed future real short
rate can be interpreted as indicating the expected time path of future inflation rates.
Under the assumption that the foreign exchange risk premium is zero, that is, that uncovered
interest parity holds, the difference between the domestic and foreign spot rate indicates the
expected average rate of depreciation of the home currency relative to the foreign currency during
the period to maturity. Similarly, the difference between the domestic and foreign forward rate
curves indicates the expected time path of the future currency depreciation rates.
Uncovered interest parity is usually rejected in empirical tests. On the other hand, estimates
policy, namelysettlement in afew years and maturity one year later.
'°The forward term premium is the excess of the forward rate overtheexpected future spot rate.Theholding
period term premium is the excess of the expected holding period return on a long bond over the spoi rate for
the(usually rathershort) holding period. The rollover term premium is the excess of the yield to maturity of a
longbond over the expected return on rollingoverashortbond to the long bond'smaturity date. See Shiller
(1990)fordetails.
"Atheoreticaldiscussion ofthe determinantsofterm, inflation and foreignexchangerisk premnia is provided
inSvensson (1993d).
9of foreign exchange risk premia have usually been small (see Hodrick (1987) and Marston (1993)
for surveys).
In the rest of the paper the forward term premium, the inflation risk premium and the foreign
exchange risk premium are assumed to be negligible (except when they are explicitly discussed
in section 5.7). Forward interest rates are consequently interpreted as indicating the expected
time path of future short rates, future monetary policy, future inflation rates (conditional upon
an assumption of future short real rates) and future currency depredation rates. Even if the
premia are not negligible, as long as they are stable shifts in the curves still indicate changes of
the variables in focus.
5. Interpreting Swedish forward rates
5.1.Timeseries
Figure fla shows a weekly time series of the marginal lending! repo rate and estimated spot rates
for 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year maturities, for the trade dates May 13, 1992—
June 15, 1994. Figure 2b shows the marginal lending/repo rate and (instantaneous) forward
rates for 6-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year settlements. Figures SoandSb show 3-
dimensional graphs of these spot and forward rates; hence Figures 2a and 2h show intersections
along corresponding maturities/settlements.
The September and November 1992 crises show up as peaks of the marginal lending rate12
Estimates of forward rates are very unreliable during the September crises and its immediate
aftermath, since Treasury bill spreads were very wide and the quotes were in all likelihood very
unreliable. This shows up in large fluctuations in the forward rates from September 16 and the
next few weeks, as can be seen in Figure 2b. Figure 2b also reveals that long forward rates
reached their May 1992 levels again only as late as August 1993.
After the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System raised the Federal funds' rate
on February 4, 1994, forward rates increased dramatically through the spring of 1994. This
increase is discussed in some detail in section 5.7 below. After the increase, forward rates are
back at their early 1993 levels.
Figure shows a time series of forward rates and the krona/deutsche mark exchange rate for
the period after the krona was floated, starting December 9, 1992 (the exchange rate is plotted
from November 18, the day before the krona was floated). The exchange rate has displayed
considerable volatility, and the krona has depreciated from 3.76 kroner per mark before it was
floated to a maximum exceeding 5 kronor per mark in September 1993, an almost 35 percent
increase in the exchange rate (about a 25 percent loss in the mark value of the krona). The
12Hôrngrenand Lindber (1993)foran account of the two crises.
10marginal lending rate and the short forward rates (up to 2-year settlement) displays a fairly
consistent downward trend. Long forward rates (10-year settlement) first increase to a maximum
at the end of March, which coincides with a considerable depreciation of the krona. Then came
a period of decreasing long forward rates and an appreciating krona which lasted into June
1993, followed by a depreciation of the krona and some decrease and then a flattening out of
long forward rates. Towards the end of 1993 and in early 1994 forward rates fell and the krona
appreciated somewhat.
5.2. Selected dates before and after the crises
Figure 5a shows a time series for the marginal lending/repo rate, and the forward rate curve
for selected trade dates before, between, and immediately after the two crises in September and
November 1992. The dotted curve shows forward rates on the trade date July 1, 1992. The
marginal lending rate was a bit above 12 percent (annually compounded; the simple rate was
11.5 percent'3), and was according to the forward rate curve expected to fall by 2 percentage
points during the next 2 years and to approach 9 percent after 1995. The curve with short dashes
shows forward rates on August 12, one month before the September crises started. The marginal
lending rate was then 0.5 percentage points higher, and expected to rise to 13.5 percent within
the next few weeks, and thereafter eventually fall to 9.5 percent. It appears that the September
crises and its increase in the marginal lending rate was to some extent anticipated by the market.
The curve with long dashes refers to the trade date October 28, 1992, three weeks before the
November crisis. The marginal lending rate was then expected to fall from about 13.4 percent to
about 10.5 percent, and there was no obvious anticipation of further increases in the immediate
future. The solid line refers to December 9, 1992, 3 weeks after the krona was floated. The
marginal lending rate was then back at a bit above 12 percent, expected to fall rather quickly
by 3 percentage points during 1993 and then increase to 10 percent, 1 percentage point higher
than the long-run level on July 1, 1992.
Since reliable market quotations of real interest rates are not available for Sweden,'4 an
explicit assumption of expected future short rates need to be made in order to infer inflation
expectations. Britain has a large and reasonably active market for indexed bonds. British real
rates have usually fluctated between 3 and 4 percent. Here I will mostly assume an expected
"The marginal lending rate is normally quoted as a simple rate. For comparison across maturities rates have
to be compounded at the mine frequency. For instance, continuously compounded or annually compounded rates
can be used. Here annually compounded rates are used in all graphs. For a simple overnight interest rate of 11.5
percent per year, the corresponding annually compounded rate is about 0.7 percentage points per year higher. A
simple rate percent per year with maturity m years is related to the annually compounded rate percent per
year according to 1 + ffim =(i+ .Forthe overnight rate, that is, for very small m, the simple rate is
close to the continuously compounded rate i.
"The Debt Office made a small issue of a 20-year indexed bond in April, 1994. See further discussion in section
5.7.
11future Swedish short real interest rate of 4 percent, although, as will be seen below, I will allow
for the possibility that the expected future real rate was lower at the end of 1993 and that it rose
considerably during the spring 1994. Thus, let me here assume that the expected future short
real rate in December 1992 was 4 percent during 1995 and later. Then the expected inflation
rate for the period after 1995 was about 6 percent per year in December 1992, 1 percentage
point per year higher than in May 1992.
5.3. The period after the krona was floated
Figure .56 shows the marginal lending rate and forward rates for selected dates for the period after
the krona was floated, December 1992-June 1994. The dotted curve, for the trade date December
9, 1992, is the same as the solid curve in Figure 5a. The curve with short dashes refers to trade
date February 25, 1993. The marginal lending rate had then been lowered from just above 12
percent to just above 10 percent (9.5 percent expressed as a simple rate). This was faster than
was expected on December 9, since the marginal lending rate had fallen below the forward rate
curve of December 9. The marginal lending rate was expected to fall further by 2 percentage
points until mid 1994, and thereafter rise to reach 11 percent after year 2000, 1 percentage point
higher than on December 9. The forward rate curve had hence tilted considerably compared to
December 9.
The marginal lending rate had been lowered by 0.75 percentage point on February 5, a
larger change than previous steps of 0.5 percentage points. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
krona started to depreciate rapidly after mid February, and forward rates increased somewhat.
It 18po8siblethat the high forward rates and the depreciating krona reflected expectations that
the Riksbank was embarking on a more expansionary monetary policy with a higher inflation
rate.
The Riksbank had in January announced an inflation target, namely that the inflation rate
during 1995 onwards rate should be 2 percentage points, with a tolerance interval ofpercent-
age point. Assuming an expected real rate of 4 percent in 1995 onwards, the expected inflation
rate was about 4.5 percent per year for 1995 and increasing up to 7 percent per year for year
2000. According to this measure, the inflation target was far from credible.15
Could forward rates increasing in the time to settlement be interpreted as something else than
an expected upward-sloping time path of future inflation rates? One possibility is of course that
there is a forward term premium that is rapidly rising with the time to maturity. There seems
to be no reason why the forward term premium should suddenly become rapidly increasing in
the time to maturity, though, and existing empirical evidence indicates that on average the term
15After the British pound was floatedonSeptember 16,1992,British long forward rates alao increased dra-
maticafly, as documented ii Bank of England (1993a,b) and Svensaon (1993c). British long forward rates did not
reach pre-September 1992 levels until almost 12 months later.
12premia are small. Alternatively, an expected increase in overnight rates might reflect a return
to normal short real rates if current short real rates were abnormally low. Swedish short real
interest rates were hardly abnormally low in February, though, and future ezpected short real
rates much above the assumed 4 percent seems unlikely, at least to me. Could the upward-sloping
forward rate curve be interpreted as an expected future increase in the marginal lending rate due
to future monetary contraction because of expected future inflation? Hardly. If the central bank
is expected to react to higher inflation with a monetary contraction, this should be incorporated
into price-setting behavior, in which case the higher inflation and resulting contraction would
not occur, and hence should not be expected to occur. Instead it seems that the expected
increase in overnight interest rates must be interpreted as an expected accommodation of the
central bank to a situation of higher inflation, higher money growth, and higher interest rates
due to lower demand for real money balances.
On February 25 the Riksbank made an announcement that emphasized the inflation target
and suggested that market expectations of lower future marginal lending rates were exaggerated.
The Riksbarik also intervened on the Treasury bills market in order to increase short interest
rates. During the next two weeks the krona appreciated (Figure 4), and long forward rates fell
considerably, more than short forward rates (Figure 4). The forward rate curve tilted back to
the position showed by the curve with long dashes in Figure 5b, for the trade date March 8,
1993. Inflation expectations fell by about 0.5 percentage points for 1995, by about 1 percentage
point for year 2000 and after (under the assumption that the expected future short real rate did
not change).
This gain in inflation target credibility vanished, however, when a parliamentary crisis for
the government began on March 10. The krona depreciated and long forward rates increased
towards the end of March to their highest level during the whole sample period, well above 11
percent (Figure 4).
Later in April long forward rates fell (Figure 4), and in the third week of April the Riksbank
lowered the marginal lending rate after having held it constant for more than two months. Long
rates continued to fall and the Riksba.nk cautiously lowered the marginal lending rate gradually
during the rest of the spring. The curve with dashes and dots in Figure 5h shows the forward
rate curve on June 30, beginning at the marginal lending rate just above 9 percent, falling to 7
percent at the end of 1994 and then rising to 9.5 percent in year 2000. Under the assumption
of a 4 percent expected real rate for 1995 onwards, inflation expectations for 1995 were almost
within 3 percent per year, the upper target limit, although for later years expected inflation
clearly exceeded the target interval.
The thin solid curve in Figure 5b shows the forward rate curve 6 months later, on December
29, 1993. The marginal lending rate had then been lowered to 8 percent (7.5 percent expressed
as a simple rate). The marginal lending rate was expected to fall very quickly by more than 1
13percentage point in the new year, consistent with speculation in the media that the Riksbank
under the new Goveruor from January 1, 1994, would lower interest rates rapidly. Under the
assumption of a 4 percent expected future real rate, inflation expectations were below 2 percent
per year for 1995, hence within the target interval between 1 and 3 percent per year. Inflation
expectations exceeded the 3 percent ceiling for 1998 and later years, though.
Bank of England (1994) reports that British real forward rates fell between October 27, 1993,
and February 2, 1994, by more than 0.5 percentage points for some settlement dates. Therefore,
expected future Swedish real rates may also have fallen during that period, perhaps by about
the same magnitude. An assumption of an expected future real rate of 3.5 percent would then
result in inflation expectations about 0.5 percentage point per year higher than those reported
above.
As argued below in section 5.7, with hindsight it appears that it is possible that forward rates
were too low at the end of 1993 because of portfolio effects or perhaps because of a "bubble" in
bond rates. This means that inflation expectations may have appeared misleadingly low at the
end of 1993 and in early 1994.
The thick solid curve shows the forward rates on June 15, 1994. The large shift in the
forward rates during the spring is further discussed in section 5.7.
Figure 5b may be contrasted with Figure 5c, which shows spot rates for the same trade
dates as in Figure 5b. The considerable increase in long forward rates between December 9 and
February 25 does not correspond to any increase in long spot rates. Short spot rates fall and
long spot rates are roughly constant. We recall from (2.7) that long spot rates are an average
of forward rates for the whole period up to the maturity date. Then, if short spot rates fall,
but long spot rates remain constant, it must be that forward rates with settlement far into the
future increase. Else the average could not remain constant.
Although both spot and forward rates in principle contain the same information, forward
rates make it more easy to infer expected future short rates and filter out expected short rates
in the immediate future; since spot rates indicate expected average future short rates whereas
forward rates indicate the precise expected time path of future short rates.
5.4. Comparison with German rates
Figure 6a shows a time series of German and Swedish rates: German overnight rates, Swedish
marginal lending/repo rates, and both countries' forward rates, for settlement in 2, 5 and 10
years. The period is December 1992-June 1994. For instance, the two thin solid curves show
forward rates with 2-year settlement. The German curves are always below the corresponding
Swedish ones.
Figure 6b shows German (thin curves) and Swedish (thick curves) forward rates for four
14selected dates: December 9, 1992, June 30 and December 29, 1993, and June 15, 1994. The
Swedish rates are higher than the German ones. The difference between the forwardrates
decreased during 1993, but it increased again during spring 1994. We see in Figure 6b that
Bundesbank has lowered the short interest rate roughly as expected by the market halfa year
earlier: each new forward rate curve starts out on or near the previous curve.
5.5. Exchange rate expectations
The difference between Swedish and German forward rates can be interpreted as theexpected
future time path of the krona depreciation rate relative to the mark. Equivalently, the difference
between Swedish and German spot rates can be interpreted as theaverage krona depreciation
rate relative to the mark up to maturity. Given the current exchange rate the expected future
exchange rates can then be calculated. Figure 7 shows the actual krona/mark exchange rate
since November 18, 1992, the day before the krona was floated, and the expected futureexchange
rate as of the same trade dates as in Figure 6b. The krona has depreciated much more rapidly
than was expected on December 9, 1992. In spite of the large depreciation that had occurred
by June 15, 1994, further depreciation was expected.
5.8. Comparison with other countries
Figure 8a compares forward rates for Sweden, Britain, France, Germany and the United States,
for June 30 and December 29, 1993, and June 15, 1994. On June 30, 1993, long forward rates for
France, Germany and the United States clustered together, Swedish forward rates were about
2 percentage points higher, and British forward rates were somewhat below the Swedishones.
In the spring of 1993 there had been an even clearer pattern of a clustering into twocategories,
Britain and Sweden with similar higher long forward rates, and France, Germany and the United
States with similar lower long forward rates)R By December 29, 1993, Britain had joined the
low rate group with long forward rates converging at 7 percent. Sweden remained alone with
almost 1.5 percent higher long rates than the rest. Britain's short rates were expected torise,
and Sweden's to fail, so that they were expected to be equal at about 6percent in 1996, after
which Sweden's rates were expected to increase more rapidly than Britain's.
By June 15, 1994, the forward rates had shifted up for all countries, but by more for Britain
and Sweden. The British forward rates now again fell between Sweden's and the other countries.
Figure 8b shows corresponding spot rates. Britain's convergence to the low-rate group by
December 29, 1993, is not apparent from the spot rates. A comparison between thespot and
forward rates give several good examples of different combinations ofaverage and marginal
"See Svensson (1993b) for a more detailed discussion of forward rates and monetary policy in these countries
for the period between Seplember 1992 and September 1993
15curves.
5.7. The interest rate increase during spring 1994
On February 4, 1994, the Board of Governors of the Federal reserve system raised the Federal
funds rate for the first time in 5 years. This marked the beginning of a period of rising bond
rates in United States and Europe, a period that has continued through the spring and is still
going on at the time of writing this (June 1994). The dramatic rise in spot and forward rates
is apparent in Figures 2a and 2b for Sweden, and in Figures 8a and 8b for the other countries.
From Figures 8a and 8b it appears that spot and forward rates have increased more for Britain
and Sweden than for France, Germany and the United States. In Figure 6b we can see that
between December 29, 1993, and June 15, 1994, the forward rate with settlement in January
1998 increased by almost 2 percentage points for Germany, and by more than 3 percentage
points for Sweden.
Interpreting this increase in spot and forward rates is a considerable challenge. Throughout
the spring the media have been full of competing explanations. Here I shall focus on the rise in
Swedish forward rates. As discussed above, the nominal forward rate can be seen as the sum of
three components: the expected future short real interest rate, term and inflation risk premia,
and the expected future inflation rate (see Svensson (1993c,d) for details). The issue at hand
is then to try to judge how the total increase in Swedish forward rates can be decomposed into
changes in these components, and especially how much of the total change is an increase in
inflation expectations. Let me discuss each component in turn.
5.7.1. Expected future real interest rates
Have expected future real interest rates increased? This question is difficult to answer in the
absence of markets for indexed bonds. The only country with a reasonably large and active
market for indexed bonds is Britain. Bank of England (1994) reports that between February
2 and May 4, 1994, real forward rates increased by about 1 percentage point at the short end
(settlement in about 2 years), and about 0.5 percentage point at the long end (settlement in 8
years and more). During the same period British nominal forward rates increased by about 3
percentage points at the short end, and about 1.5 percentage points at the long end. Thus, for
Britain the increase in real forward rates was roughly a third of the increase in nominal forward
rates. In May 1994 the level of British real forward rates was between 3.5 and 4 percent.
The real forward rate equals the expected future real spot rate plus a real term premium.
The increase in British real forward rates may thus consist of an increase in both the expected
future spot rate and the real term premium. Let me for simplicity interpret the increase in real
forward rates as an equal increase in expected future real spot rates, although later I shall allow
16for the possibility that an increase in the real term premium is included.
As a first approximation, one might assume that the increase in expected future Swedish real
rates was about of the same magnitude in Sweden as in Britain. Could expected future Swedish
real rates have increased more than British rates did? One possibility is of course that the
large Swedish budget deficit might induce higher real rates on Swedish government bonds than
in other countries, due to a portfolio effect because of a large supply and an inelastic demand
(assuming there is yet no default premium on Swedish bonds). On the other hand, Swedish
bonds are still such a small share of world portfolios that demand should be rather elastic. Even
though Swedish real rates may be higher than British ones, there is also no clear reason why
the margin should have increased during the spring.
The Swedish Debt Office issued an indexed bond in mid-April, 1994, a zero-coupon bond
with 20 year maturity. The bond was bought at a real rate of 4 percent per year. Although this
rate is consistent with the assumption of a 4 percent real rate used above in this paper, the rate
on this long bond does not of course indicate much about the real rate for the next few years,
since it is the average real rate for the next 20 years. Also, the issue was not large, the Debt
Office did not issue all it had planned to issue (since it did not accept rates above 4 percent),
and no active secondary market has developed.
In conclusion, I find it reasonable to assume that Swedish expected future real rates may
have increased by 1-1.5 percentage points during the spring (possibly including an increase in
the real term premium), and that the expected future real rate may be about 5 percent after
the spring (possibly including a real term premium) rather than 3.5-4 percent before the spring.
5.7.2. Term premia
Could term and inflation risk premia have increased during the spring? Let me first discuss term
premia. A (forward) term premium is the excess of the forward rate over the expectedfuture
short spot rate. A positive (negative) term premium implies that the forward rate overestimates
(underestimates) the expected future spot rate.
When nominal and real forward rates are compared, as can be done for Britain, the differ-
ence between the nominal and real forward rate equals the sum of the differencebetween the
expected future nominal and real spot rate and the difference between the nominaland real
term premium." If both term preinia increase by the same magnitude, the increasescancel.
Above I have disregarded the real term premium and interpreted the increase in British real
forward rates as an increase in expected future real spot rates, which led to the assumption of
an increase in expected real Swedish spot rates of 1-1.5 percentage points. Alternatively,I could
t7The nominal (real) term premium is the excs of the nominal (real) forward rate over the expected future
nominal (real) spot rate.
17have assumed that this increase included a possible increase in the real term premium. If the
nominal term premium increases by the same amount as the real one, no bias results. Thus,
in the case when the term premia increase by the same magnitude has already been implicitly
handled above.
It remains to consider the possibility that the nominal term premium has increased more than
the real one. According to standard portfolio theory (see Svensson (1993d)) the nominal (real)
term premium is proportional to the negative of the covariance between the future nominal (real)
spot rate and the nominal (real) return on the market portfolio (or nominal (real) consumption,
depending upon which asset-pricing model is assumed). If the variability of the nominal spot
rate has increased more than the variability of the real rate, it is possib1e that the covariance
for the nominal rate has increased in magnitude more than the covariance of the real rate. To
judge whether that has happened during spring 1994 requires additional research, though.
A popular explanation, frequently mentioned in the media, for the interest rate movements
during the spring is that some investors (notably so-called hedge funds) during 1993 took large
long positions in long American and European bonds, financed by short borrowing, in the
expectation of falling long rates and corresponding capital gains. Such large open positions
in long bonds would depress long spot rates, and also lead to low forward rates and perhaps
negative term premia. If so, forward rates at the end of 1993 would have underestimated
expected future spot rates. Alternatively, some investors expecting falling long rates is consistent
with these investors expecting low future short rates and also anticipating that the market will
eventually share those expectations. In that case average expectations of future spot rates
were exceptionally low at the end of 1993. The Federal Reserve's increase in the Federal funds
rate on February 4 would then indicate a shift to a new situation with rising short rates, and
hence rising long rates. The investors with long positions in iong bonds would then attempt to
close their positions, with rising bond rates as a result. Although this argument may help to
explain why US long rates would go up, it is not dear why European long rates would follow.
One possibility is that investors for no obvious reason also suddenly expected rising European
short rates, another possibility is that losses on American investments forced investors to reduce
exposure in European investment, a third possibility is that some long investment in Europe
was financed with short borrowing in the United States (in which case one perhaps should have
seen a significant appreciation of the dollar against European currencies during the spring).
According to this explanation term premia (or expected future short rates) were perhaps
too low at the end of 1993, whereas they have been corrected during the spring or perhaps
even become too high by now. This explanation can also be interpreted as referring to a bond
"bubble" at the end of 1993, a situation when bond rates lose contact with fundamentals and due
to bandwagon effects fall beyond what is warranted by fundamentals. The Federal Reserve's
increase in the Federal funds rate would then have burst the bubble. The events during the
18spring might then either be interpreted as a return to fundamentals, or perhapsthe start of a
period with a "reversed" bubble, a situation when bond rateslose contact with fundamentals
but become too high rather than too low.
An interesting pOS8ibility is that Fed's maintaining a very low Federal funds rate for so long,
and some European central banks' eagerness to lower short interest rates, may have fueled such
a bond bubble during 1993, whereas higher short rates mighthave dampened such a bubble or
even prevented it from occurring.
Whether or not this explanation is relevant to the interest rate movements in Europe and
United States, I do not see that it can rationalize why rates in Britain and Sweden increased
much more than rates in France, Germany and United States.
5.7.3. Inflation risk premia
Could inflation risk premia have increased during the spring? The inflation risk premiumis
the excess of the difference between expected future nominal and real short spot rates overthe
expected future inflation rate. The inflation risk premium depends on the perceived variability
of future inflation; according to standard portfolio theory it is proportional to the negativeof the
covariance between inflation and the real return on the market portfolio (or real consumption).
Increased uncertainty about inflation may imply an increased magnitude of the covariance,and
hence a larger inflation risk premium (if the covariance is negative).
Commentators sometimes for some reason seem to imply that it is better if an increase
in nominal interest rates is due to an increased inflation risk premium than to anincrease
in expected inflation (expected inflation interpreted as the perceived mean of inflation).This
cannot be right. An increased inflation risk premium is of course by itself a problemfor a
monetary policy with price stability as a goal.
An increase in the variability of inflation without an increase in expected inflation is an
example of a so-called mean-preserving spread. A mean-preserving spreadfor inflation requires
that the probability of both high and low inflation increases so as to leave the mean unchanged.
In practice, it seems more likely that increased variability of inflation corresponds to anincreased
probability of high inflation and a constant or reduced probabilityof low inflation. That is, an
increased variability of inflation goes with an increased mean (this point is made byBank of
England (1994)). Therefore, in many situations an increased inflationrisk premium would also
imply increased expected inflation. An increase in the inflationrisk premium is therefore a
problem for monetary policy for two reasons, since it indicatesboth an increased variance and
an increased mean of inflation. When evaluating monetary policy,for practical purposes the
distinction between the inflation risk premium and expected inflation maybe less important.18
15A rather imperfect measure of inflation uncertainty, the standard deviation of answers to a Swedishinflation
195.7.4. Inflation expectations
Let me finally consider the remainder, the expected future inflation rate. Above I noted that
the Swedish forward rate with settlement in 1998 increased by more than 3 percentage points
between December 1993 and June 1994. Suppose expected future real rates increased by 1-
1.5 percentage points, possibly including an increase in term premia. That would leave 1.5-2
percentage points to be explained by an increase in the expected inflation rate and the inflation
risk premium. Suppose the inflation risk premium increased by as much as 0.5 percentage point;
that would leave 1-1.5 percentage points increase in inflation expectations. This is still a sizable
increase in inflation expectations.
Let us look at levels instead. Suppose that we accept the assumption that in June 1994
the expected future real rate was as high as 5 percent. This is a rather high real rate, but
we may interpret it as also including possible term premia. In June, the nominal forward rate
with settlement in 3-5 years was a bit above 10 percent. Subtracting the expected future real
rate gives inflation expectations of about 5 percent per year, possibly including an inflation risk
premium. Is that a reasonable result?
It may be illuminating to consider the result of a survey of inflation expectations (Aragon
(1994)), where the largest domestic and foreign investors on the Swedish bond market are
asked each quarter about their inflation expectations for the next 2 and 5 years. From this
the investor's implicit expectations for years 3-5 can be computed. The thick curve in Figure
9 shows the result. In mid February and mid May 1994, inflation expectations for years 3-5
were 4.3 and 4.6 percent per year, respectively. This is clearly a small increase compared to
the increase of 1-1.5 percentage points above. Although the inflation expectations in the survey
generally move in the same direction as the forward rates, they fluctuate much less. On the
other hand, the survey inflation expectations in May are rather dose to the 5 percent per year
inflation expectations calculated from the June forward rate. The survey results thus support
the view that forward rates were too low in early 1994. The large increase in estimated inflation
expectations reported above may be too large, not primarily because forward rates were too high
at the end of the spring, but rather because they were too low at the beginning of the spring.
In summary, the conclusion I would like to draw is that nominal forward rates were probably
too low in early 1994, with either negative term premia or very low expected future spot rates.
Disregarding premia and assuming a 3.5-4 percent real interest rate then may have resulted
in too low an estimate of inflation expectations. With hindsight, the apparent reduction of
inflation expectations at the end of 1993 was probably to a considerable extent an illusion. The
increase in nominal forward rates during the spring has corrected this, but the forward rates
have increased much more. Part of the increase in nominal rates is explained by an increase in
expectation. survey further discussed below (Aragon (1994)), actually fell between February and May 1994.
20expected future real rates. This does not explain the whole increase in nominal forward rates,
though, but inflation expectations a few years ahead have increased as well, and possibly also the
inflation risk premium. In a situation with considerable real rate movements, it would of course
be particularly useful with reliable market quotes on indexed bonds of different maturities. In
the absence of reliable market quotes on real interest rates, an assumption that the expected
future real spot rate has increased to 5 percent in June 1994 may be reasonable. This results in
an expected future inflation rate in June 1994 of about 5 percent per year for 1997 onwards.
6. Conclusions
With flexible exchange rates, monetary policy in Europe will have to rely more on indicators
than previously under fixed rates, especially since it will most likely be difficult, at least for
some time, to find appropriate and reliable intermediate targets for monetary policy. Several
different indicators will have to be used. One of the potential indicators, the (implied) forward
interest rate curve, can be used to indicate market expectations of the time-paths of future short
interest rates, monetary policy, inflation rates and currency depreciation rates.
The forward rate curve contains the same information as the spot rate curve, but it presents
the information in a way that makes it easier to interpret for monetary policy purposes. Thus
the forward rate curve separates market expectations for the short, medium and long term more
easily than the spot rate curve. Since monetary policy measures have effects with "long and
variable lags," looking beyond the short term is often necessary in monetary policy analysis.
Using long spot rates or long bond yields instead of long forward rates can give a misleading
impression, since long spot rates and long bond yields include expectations of interest rate
movements in the short term. In long forward rates, expectations of interest rate movements in
the short term have been filtered out.
The paper has demonstrated both the estimation and interpretation of forward rates. The
estimation has been done by an extended version of Nelson and Siegel's (1987) functional form.
The extended version gives a very good fit in the relatively few cases when the original version
is insufficient.
The interpretation of forward rates has been demonstrated in a fairly detailed study of
Swedish forward rates during the eventful period May 1992-June 1994. The study has revealed
that the September 1992 increase in the marginal lending rate to some extent was anticipated by
the market, and that long forward rates (as in Britain) rose considerably after the currency was
floated. It is possible that this indicated increased long-run inflation expectations in reaction
to a faster than expected lowering of the marginal lending rate during December 1992-February
1993. Movements in forward rates and inflation expectations in February and March 1993 are
consistent with likely reactions to R.iksbank actions and the crisis in parliament. The studyhas
21also revealed that long forward rates did not reach their May 1992 levelsuntil August 1993. The
dramatic increase in forward rates during the spring 1994 has been discussed in somedetail.
The conclusion is that forward rates may have been artificially low at theend of 1993 and in
early 1994, due to possible portfolio effects and perhaps even a temporarybubble in long bond
rates, resulting in too low estimates of inflation expectations.The rise in forward rates during
the spring 1994 appears to have been caused by both rising expected futurereal rates, rising
inflation expectations, and possibly also rising inflation risk premia.
The paper's maintained assumption is that term, inflation and foreign exchange risk premia
have generally been so small as to warrant the use of forward rates as indicating expected
future short rates, future inflation rates and future currency depreciation rates. This maintained
assumption has some empirical support. Estimates of average forward premiafor settlement in a
few years and maturity one year later indicate that the premia are small. Also, the conventional
wisdom that upward sloping yield curves imply positive term premia is not correct, since the
upward sloping yield curve may be explained by expectations of rising short rates overthe sample.
However, according to the theory, it is actually conditional time-varying premia,rather than
unconditional average premia that are relevant. More research on, and estimation of, conditional
time-varying forward premia with for monetary policy relevant combinations ofsettlement and
maturity is called for. Option prices on bond futures include information about perceivedfuture
interest rate volatility which can be used in estimating premia (cf. Bank of England (1994)).
The literature has usually considered other term premia, the holding period and rollover term
premia. (defined in footnote 10 above), and other combinations of settlementand maturity. The
literature has also frequently focused on testing the expectations hypothesis (the hypothesisof
zero risk premia) rather than on actually estimating the size of the prerniain order to judge
whether the premia are economically as well as statistically significant. If conditional time-
varying premia are non-negligible, that does not necessarily mean that forward rates cannotbe
used as indicators, only that the premia should be estimated simultaneously with the forward
rates and then used to adjust the forward rates.
Availability of market real interest rates on indexed bonds with maturities between 2and
10 years, as in Britain, would give increased precision to the interpretation of spot and forward
rate movements for monetary policy purposes, especially during periods like the end of 1993and
the spring of 1994 when real rates may have been volatile.
A. Appendix. Details on the estimation of forward rates
For a given trade date, let there ben coupon bonds (c,,mj,y,,pj), j= 1,...,n,where c2, rn,,
y, and p, denote, respectively, the coupon rate, thetime to maturity, the observed yield to
maturity and the observed price of bond j,whichis assumed to have a face value of 100 units
22of domestic currency. (The bond prices are computed from the yields to maturity according to
(2.3), or vice versa.) For a given parameter vector btheestimated prices of the bonds, P,(b),
arecomputed with the discount function d(rn;b)in(3.4) evaluating each coupon payment.
More precisely, for bonds with annual coupon payments, let r,k, k =1,2, ...,K,,denote the
times to the coupon payments on bond j,whereK is the number of coupon payments. In the
special case when rn,isan integer, we simply have r,k = k and K, = m. In the general case
we have
r,k = rn—[rn,] +k —1and
(A.1)
K, = [m,]+1,
where [m,J denotes the largest integer that is strictly smaller than rn. The estimated price of
each bond, P,(b), is the present value of the bond when the coupon payments and the face value
are priced with the discount function,
K,,
P,(b) c,d(r,,; b) + lOOd(r,K,; 6), j= 1,...,n. (A.2)
k=1
Forsemiannual coupon payments, that is, for Britain and the United States, these relations
are accordingly modified (see for instance Grave (1986)).
When price errors are minimized, the observed price is assumed to differ from the estimated
price by an error term, €j,
(A.3)
Theestimated prices are then fitted to the observed prices with Non-linear Least Squares,
the General Method of Moments, or Maximum Likelihood. The estimates in this paper are
Maximum Likelihood. The 95 percent confidence intervals have been computed with the delta
method and are heteroskedasticity-consistent.19
When yield errors are minimized, the estimated yield to maturity for bond j,Y,(b),is
computed from the observed bond price P,(b) by solving (2.3). Although (2.3) is a non-linear
higher-order equation with the same order as the uumber of coupon payments, it has only
one real root and is easy to solve numerically, for instance with thestandard Newton-Raphson
algorithm (see Gave (1986)). The observed yield to maturity is assumed todiffer from the
estimated yield to maturity by an error term,
(A.4)
1Let anddenote the estimates of the parameter vector b and it covariance matrix, respectively. The
deltamethod impliesthat for the purpose of computing confidence intervals for the forward rate, the estimated
forward rate f(m;b) for a given settlement m is considered to be distributed as a Normal variablewithmean
f(m;&) and covariance whereJ'(M is the column vector of partial derivatives with respect to
the parameters, etc.
23and the estimated yields to maturity are then fitted to the observed yields to maturity.
The estimation has been done with the restriction that the forward rate curve (andhence
the spot rate curve) should start at the left end from the marginal lending rate orthe overnight
rate, except for Britain.
The difference between minimizing price and yield errors, and between the original and
extended Nelson and Siegel functional form, is illustrated in Figures lb and Figures A1-A3.
Figure Ala shows the estimated spot and forward rate curves forDecember 29, 1993, when
price errors are minimized with the original Nelson and Siegelfunctional form in (3.1). We
see that the fit for the Treasury bill yields is unsatisfactory. FigureA lb shows estimated and
observed prices. For the prices the fit is good. The estimated prices are close to the observed
prices, and the error bars that denote 95 percent confidence intervals are hardlyvisible in the
Figure. The root mean squared price error (RMSPE) is 0.18 kronor (forbonds with face value
100 kronor), whereas the root mean squared yield error (RMSYE) is 0.22 percentage points. The
maximum absolute yield error is 0.57 percentage points and occurs for the 3-month Treasury
bill.
Figure A2a shows the estimated spot and forward rate curves for the same trale date, when
instead yield errors are minimized, still with the original Nelson and Siegel functional form. The
R.MSYE has fallen to 0.16 percentage points. The maximum absolute yield error has fallen to
0.38 percentage points and still occurs for the 3-month Treasury bill. The fit for the yields is
still hardly satisfactory. The confidence intervals for the forward rates are rather large. The
RMSPE has increased to 0.51 kronor. We see in Figure A2b that the fit for prices is worse than
in Figure Aib, and that the confidence intervals are larger.
Figure lb shows the estimated spot and forward rates when yield errors are minimized and
when the extended Nelson and Siegel functional form is used. Figure A3shows the corresponding
observed and estimated prices. The fit is quite good both for yields and prices. The RMSYE is
only 0.03 percentage points, and the RMSPE is 0.16 kronor. The maximum absolute yield error
is 0.05 percentage points and occurs for thel2-month Treasury bill. It is evident from Figure 1
that the second U-shape (the thin solid line) allows a much better fit at the short end of the
spot rate curve.
The term structure on December 29 is unusually complex. In most cases the original Nelson
and Siegel functional form with minimized yield errors gives a satisfactory result, and in quite
a few cases the difference between the estimates for minimized yield errors and minimized price
errors is small.
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Figure Ba. Forward Rates by Trade Date
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